Introduction
In 1971 Denmark deregulated its domestic banking markets and the entry of foreign banks. Only one foreign bank entered initially and the number of foreign banks grew slowly over time. Finland opened next (1978) but no foreign banks entered until four years later when further deregulation made entry attractive. Norway (1984) and Sweden (1985) opened more than a decade after Denmark and a number of banks all entered at once. Today, after falling from its peaks, the number of foreign banks and their share of each country's banking system assets is recovering. In some cases, especially when acquisitions of domestic banks are involved, the number and market share represents a new peak.
The issues of entry, survival and success, especially in the context of foreign direct investment (FDI) are important ones to corporate strategy and these four examples give us an opportunity to study a special type of entry situation. The opportunities for the foreign banks did not develop slowly with the evolution of an economy or a technology but suddenly (though with forewarning) when governments removed their barriers. In all four countries, opening to foreign banks accompanied a more general deregulation that resulted in competitive turbulence. The authorities welcomed the foreign banks and perhaps even sought them out to add competition and new capabilities to the domestic market. However the authorities were also concerned about the effect of the entrants on monetary policy, credit control and the soundness of the existing domestic banks.
The foreign entrants were particularly well-adapted to take advantage of the openings. They were offshoots of their parent banks: large, internationally well-known, existing organizations. As such they were not subject to many of the hazards facing totally new firms such as the need to establish reputations in order to have access to capital, or to being particularly vulnerable to stochastic shocks because of their small size. However they were still subject to the liability of foreignness.
Our objective is to determinants of the foreigners' market share of the assets of the banking system as a whole, not the survival and success of individual banks. The literature on the evolution of the market share of foreign banks is at best slim. Still, the literature does suggest some hypotheses that are amenable to testing. We relate the foreign banks' market share in each of the four countries to a time trend, to each host country's trade balance, and to the banking system's loan loss experience. The first variable captures learning and selection. The second proxies for access to business related to the foreign banks' access to their home markets. The last captures the affect of a possible crisis-induced lack of competitiveness of the host-country banks.
In Section 2 we discuss the regulatory and economic environment that the foreign banks faced in the Nordic countries at entry and after. We also present the basic data on the development of the foreign bank sector in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In Section 3 we discuss the limited literature on the market share of foreign banks, and formulate three hypotheses regarding the determinants of the foreign banks' share of the assets of the banking system. In Section 4 we present the results of testing our model. Section 5 concludes the paper by comparing and contrasting the experiences of the foreign banks in the four environments and pointing out some limitations of the analysis.
The Nordic case

The environment facing the foreign banks
Since at least 1920, Finland, Norway and Sweden had forbidden foreign banks to open branches (Wallenberg c.1920 ). Denmark's prohibition apparently came later. The hostility to foreign banks in the Nordic countries was consistent with policies in other developed countries with governments oriented towards social welfare (Tschoegl 1985) .
For example, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, among many others, also restricted the entry of foreign banks after World War II. These policies of closure, though they had persisted for decades, eventually collapsed in the 1980s as a philosophy of deregulation, including the removal of barriers to entry, swept the world (for Sweden see Engwall 1994a see Engwall & 1997 . At first, the Nordic countries only permitted foreign banks to enter with de novo subsidiaries or at most small shareholdings in existing domestic banks (OECD 1984) . As Engwall (1992) points out, governments prefer subsidiaries to branches as subsidiaries give the governments more control over solvency. However banks prefer branches as branches are less costly and more flexible. By the mid-1990s, all four permitted foreign banks to enter with branches. In Finland, Norway and Sweden, since 1990 or so, the authorities have also permitted foreign banks to acquire domestic banks.
The opening to foreign banks was part of a general deregulation of the domestic markets in the Nordic countries that increased competition and may have resulted in some efficiency gains. When Berg et al., (1992) examined productivity in Norwegian banks over the period 1980-1989, they found that productivity appeared to regress prior to deregulation and then grow rapidly afterwards. After deregulation, the range between the most and least productive bank shrank; this shrinkage appeared to have been the result of the larger banks reducing their deficiency vis-à-vis the smallest banks. Shaffer's (1994) cross-country study using data from 1979 to 1991, showed Norway and Sweden to have a highly competitive banking system without excess capacity; his study identified the existence of market power in Sweden and some excess capacity in Finland. Berg et al., (1993) also compared banking efficiency in Finland, Norway and Sweden in 1990; the average Norwegian bank was more efficient than the average Finnish bank but less efficient than the average Swedish bank. Earlier, Rinde (1986) too had found that Norwegian banks were not less efficient than those in other OECD countries though Swedish banks did seem slightly more efficient.
The studies by Rinde (1986) , Berg et al., (1992) , Berg et al., (1993) and Shaffer (1993) essentially predate the loan losses that devastated the banking systems of the Nordic countries, among others, in the early 1990s. Møller and Nielsen (1995) suggest that the banking crisis in the Nordic countries really consisted of four different crises.
However, the evidence is the crises in the Nordic countries were part of a worldwide phenomenon. A key factor was the property boom that swept across a number of countries in the late 1980s. Ball (1994) suggests two primary causes for the boom. First, technical change in key service industries led to an upsurge in demand for buildings from the mid-1970s onward.
Second, deregulation increased credit availability. Monetary authorities, attempting to rein-in the credit expansion, ended the boom. Bartholomew (1994) reports that deflation of real estate values hit banking systems in Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United States. Ball (1994) adds Australia, the UK and Japan to the list. Reflecting on the experience of the US and Japan, Kindleberger (1995) has an insightful paper on the difficulty that asset inflation poses for monetary policy. In the Nordic countries, the authorities tightened monetary policy and required their banks to raise their loan loss reserves. Together, these measures brought about banking crises in all four countries.
Overall, loan losses at the commercial banks were less severe in Denmark and Finland than in Norway and Sweden (Tables 1-4) . However, rank-orderings of countries are sensitive to definitions. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) do not list Denmark among their cases of bank crises, but estimate recapitalization costs as a percent of GDP at 8% for Finland, 4% for Norway, and 6% for Sweden.
All four Nordic countries saw the number of domestic banks shrink in the 1980s and into the 1990s. The entry of foreign banks temporarily increased the numbers but the foreign banks too saw their numbers fall. Only Sweden is now seeing an upturn in both the number of foreign and domestic banks. Against the above background we will now analyze the development in the four countries one by one, in the order of deregulation, i.e. Denmark (1971 ), Finland (1978 , Norway (1984) and Sweden (1985) , which fortuitously is also the alphabetic order (at least in English).
Denmark
Until the early 1960s, agriculture was the cornerstone of the Danish economy. Hence there was little need for banks with a large lending capacity. Thus in the late 1950s, Denmark had about 160 private banks and about 475 savings banks (Østrup 1989) . As Denmark's developed industrially, the need for financial services grew dramatically. In step with this development, the large banks began to acquire smaller ones, and small local banks merged to form regional banks.
Accession to the EEC in 1972, led Denmark gradually to deregulate, mainly as consequence of the implementation of various EU directives. Deregulation introduced a period of increasing competition, mergers, growing international activities and crossing of demarcation lines among financial institutions (Otholm et al. 1994 ).
Mergers, due in part to the large loan losses of recent years, have reduced the number of commercial banks to 70 now (Table 1) . Still, despite the losses, no banks required government rescue and the banking system as a whole did not require a government guarantee. The system owes much of its stability to regulators who required more capital than was the case elsewhere.
Two mergers in late 1990 created two, almost equally-sized nationwide banks, Den Danske Bank-now the largest bank-and Unibank, that dominate the market. There are also nine medium-sized banks, numerous small local banks, and seven foreign banks. In 1988, the top two banks had 40% of all banking system assets and the top four banks had 62%. In 1995, the respective shares were 62% and 83%.
All banks are nominally universal banks. Since the 1960s, the major banks have also increased the volume of their international business and have established branches and subsidiaries abroad (Vastrup 1983) . Competition within the banking sector is stiff and the banks have developed sophisticated products for both retail and corporate customers. (Finans and Samfund 1995) .
Until the end of the 1980s it was American-owned banks that dominated the ranks of the foreign banks; now it is European-owned banks that dominate. In 1991, Chase Manhattan closed its branch. The branch served the needs of Chase's US corporate clients with operations in Denmark and Chase decided that it could service these customers equally well and less expensively from its London branch (Børsen 1992).
The foreign banks are small and specialize in providing services (including loans) to medium to large firms. A recent inquiry among Danish companies found that 42% of the Danish companies surveyed used foreign-owned banks. None of the companies used a foreign-owned bank as the main bank, but many companies use them as the second or third bank and for specialized financial activities. The same inquiry showed that the Danish companies more often were working with the European headquarters (typically in London) than with a smaller Danish branch.
The foreign banks do have a larger share of some niche markets. The Ministry of Industry (1992) estimates that foreign banks have a market share of around 10% in services such as cash management and foreign exchange. Currently Handelsbanken, which has three branch offices, is the only foreign bank active in retail banking (Swedish Banker's Association, 1998). Lastly, over the period for which we have data, the rank, among all banks in Denmark, of the largest foreign bank appears to have risen.
Finland
In Finland, deregulation began in 1978 and bank lending increased sharply thereafter.
The number of domestic banks did not shrink but neither did it increase until the early 1990s, precisely as the economy ran into severe trouble, due in part to the collapse of the Russian economy in 1991. Exports from Finland to Russia fell from about 25% of exports to about 3%. This caused a fall in Finland's GNP and hence an increase in the ratio of the banks' loan losses to GDP.
During the crisis, the government had to take over Skopbank, the 3 rd largest bank; the two largest banks survived but merged in 1995. The number of banks, both domestic and foreign, has shrunk from the peak in 1991, despite further foreign entry (Table 2) . Overall, the Finnish market has become highly concentrated; in 1996, the two largest banks accounted for 60% of total system assets; the four largest accounted for 69%.
Hambros Bank (1973) and Citibank (1977) became the first foreign banks to establish a presence when they each opened a representative office. In 1979, the Finnish government authorized foreign banks to establish subsidiaries, but it took further deregulation and relaxation of exchange controls in 1982 before foreign banks were willing to enter (Pauli 1984) . Then Citibank, Chase Manhattan and Banque Indosuez established subsidiaries. Banque Indosuez's entry was an 85-15 joint-venture with
Postipankki. In 1984, the government used the foreign banks to break the domestic banks' agreement to control interest rates (Rautava 1994 
Norway
Norway deregulated in 1984; that year saw the founding of the first new domestic bank since the end of World War II, and others followed. At the same time, some domestic banks merged. Also, Ongena and Smith (1997a) provide evidence that
Norwegian companies listed on the stock exchange reduced their number of bank relationships as deregulation progressed. Loans outstanding doubled as banks pursued market share (Lindblom 1994) . Already by 1987, the Norwegian banks' loan loss provisions had begun to rise markedly. (An additional factor beyond increased risk taking was the government's introduction of stricter accounting standards.) In the late 1980s, several smaller domestic banks did fail or underwent forced mergers. In Norway the crisis peaked a year or so before the peak in the other Nordic countries (Koskenkylä 1994) , perhaps because the fall in oil prices in 1986 hurt the Norwegian economy but helped most other major economies.
The first and third largest banks (Den norske Creditbank and Bergen Bank) merged in 1990 to form Den norske Bank (DnB). Shortly thereafter the government was forced to acquire DnB, Christiania Bank og Kreditkassen (CBK) and Fokus Bank, the then second and third largest. The government reprivatized Fokus, but retains substantial ownership in DnB and CBK. In 1980, the two largest banks accounted for 43% and the four largest for 71%. In 1996, the two largest banks accounted for 60% of banking system assets and the four largest accounted for 77% (Norwegian Commercial Banks 1981 and 1997) .
In 1985, seven foreign banks established subsidiaries in Norway; ultimately the number of foreign banks in Norway peaked at nine before declining and then returning to the present eight (Table 3) . Overall, the foreign banks' market share has grown since entry. Interestingly, Ongena and Smith (1997b) 
Sweden
In 1986, Sweden became the last of the four Nordic countries to deregulate. The number of domestic banks in Sweden initially fell. The 3 rd and 4 th largest banks, Gotabanken and Nordbanken, were the result of mergers that arguably exacerbated the maintenance of internal controls. With deregulation credit also expanded, leading to loan losses (Engwall 1994 (Engwall & 1997 . Eventually the government had to take over and merge the two, after having first transferred the worst of their assets to a so-called "bad bank." Of the large banks only Svenska Handelsbanken emerged unscathed (Wallander, 1994) . Overall, the number of foreign and domestic banks is growing again though the net number represents the outcome of a race between entry and merger. In 1986, before deregulation, the two largest banks accounted for 37% and the four largest accounted for 60% of banking assets (Statistics Sweden).By 1996, the proportions are 51% and 82%. Postgirot's more than 1,000 local post offices.
After the initial rush in 1987, the number of foreign banks then essentially declined;
however since 1994, the number of foreign banks in Sweden has more than doubled (Table 4) . Almost all the recent entries have taken the form of branches. GE Capital is an exception; it acquired and merged three finance companies and in 1997 received a banking license. Unlike the situation in the other three Nordic countries, the largest foreign bank in Sweden has always been a European or a Nordic bank.
The general development of the foreign bank sector
In all four Nordic countries, even where the market share of the foreign banks as a whole currently is below its peak, individual foreign banks have done well. In each country, the ranking among all banks of the largest foreign bank has increased. Foreign banks gained the largest market share in Finland and Norway, but those foreign banks that made the most progress did so by acquiring local firms. Only Denmark has been immune, due probably in large part to the impediments to cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and the lack of a crisis large enough to force the issue.
In all four countries the nationality of the largest foreign bank has changed as well as the identity. If we take the nationality of the largest bank as an indicator, we can detect three eras. 1970 to the mid-1980s was the American era. The mid-1980s to the early 1990s was the European era. In Sweden, the last to liberalize, the US never provided the largest foreign bank. The mid-1990s has seen the start of a Nordic era.
Some US-and European-owned banks have decided to serve the Nordic market from other locations in Europe. They are closing their branches without, however, abandoning their activities in the Nordic countries. They can exploit scale economies by centralizing their staff in fewer locations without at the same time losing all their Nordic clients. The remaining foreign-owned banks are expanding the scope of their activities. As far as entering the retail market is concerned, the Nordic owned banks have an advantage because of the language, the similarities in culture and the common structure of the Nordic societies (Nordström and Vahlne 1994) .
The mid-1990s are seeing the emergence of a Nordic strategy among the Nordic banks. Now, many of the Nordic banks are penetrating each others' markets. Deregulation has had both direct and indirect effects. As the Nordic countries deregulated entry, and especially when they permitted the operation of branches, they made entry easier for smaller banks. Jacobsen and Tschoegl (1999) and Unibank to enter each others' markets.
Market shares of foreign banks
The literature on foreign bank entry
Over the last two decades foreign direct investment in banking has drawn substantial theoretical and empirical attention and Williams (1997) provides a comprehensive survey of the theoretical literature. However, the literature on the market share of the foreign banks is sparse and almost entirely cross-sectional in nature.
Walter ( A small number of studies do look at the evolution of the size of the foreign bank sector over time. Tschoegl (1988) points out that foreign banks' share of banking system assets was high at the beginning of the opening of Japan in the mid-19 th Century and again immediately after World War II before declining, but he does not model the decline. Williams (1996) looked at the performance of Japanese banks in Australia following Australia's removal of its entry restrictions. He found that the foreign banks' market share peaked some eight years after entry. However, the falling share of the Japanese banks coincided with the domestic problems of the Japanese banks and their customers in the 1990s, problems that may have resulted in some retrenchment for both.
As far as entry per se is concerned, the existing literature on entry of new firms makes much of the liability of newness --the need to establish organizational routines (Baum, 1996) . However, in the case of entry by foreign banks, the parents of the entrants are wellestablished firms. The ventures themselves are new, but the organizations of which they are a part are not. Tschoegl (1982) , Tschoegl (1983) , Ball and Tschoegl (1985), Tschoegl (1988) , Ursacki and Vertinsky (1992) and Williams (1996) all provide evidence that the banks that engage in FDI are large and generally have extensive experience with foreign direct investment.
However, the new ventures are foreign and this means that they must face the challenge of the liability of foreignness. This liability has three aspects. The first of these is that the new entrant faces the cost of operating at a distance and must learn a new environment. These issues have been part of the literature on FDI since Hymer's (1960) seminal thesis and are an important part of other subsequent theoretical papers such as Kindleberger (1969) , Buckley and Casson (1976) , Caves (1982) and Hennart (1982) .
However, operating at a distance does not appear to be a major source of problems in FDI in banking (Engwall 1992) . Several studies such as those of Choi et al., (1986 and that look at financial centers find no effect of distance on FDI in banking. Distance could have an indirect effect on FDI in banking. To the degree that banks follow trade and their customers, and that these fall off with distance so will FDI in banking. Thus one should not be surprised at the absence of Japanese banks in the Nordic countries, and one should expect to see banks from Europe and the other Nordic countries.
The problems of operating in an unfamiliar environment is a different case. As Caves (1982) has argued, these would be most severe in horizontal FDI where the foreign firms are competing with local firms for a share of the host country market. Thus the liability of foreignness would be least critical in financial centers, especially offshore centers, and most critical in retail markets. Tschoegl (1987) argues that it is precisely for these reasons that, ethnic banking aside, that we see so little FDI in retail banking. Obviously, the liability of foreignness, even in retail banking, should be least for other Scandinavian banks given the shared national histories and cultures, and the highly similar languages. Even for a Finnish bank such as the Union Bank of Finland (now part of MeritaNordbanken), a bank historically of and for the Swedish commercial community in Finland, Scandinavia would not be alien. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) have the only micro study of the liability of foreigness that we are aware of. They studied the entry and survival of banks' foreign exchange trading rooms and found that the liability of foreignness changed over time. In the first two years, the survival rate of host-country and foreign-owned trading rooms were similar; this suggests that the liability of newness is initially about the same magnitude as the liability of foreignness. For the next fourteen years, foreign-owned trading rooms owned by foreign banks exited at a higher rate than those owned by hostcountry banks; the exit rate peaked at eight years.
The third aspect of the liability of foreigness, and one that is particularly critical in banking, is that the new entrant must establish relationships with clients (Engwall and Johanson 1990) . As Kindleberger (1983) has argued, banks when they go abroad frequently follow their commercial and industrial customers or lead them abroad. In either case, the foreign bank is using existing relationships. Generally though, dealing only with home-country customers abroad will limit the foreign bank to a niche in the host country.
If the foreign bank is to grow beyond that niche it must establish ties with host-country customers. Whether the foreign banks will be able to do so will depend on the competitive conditions in the host market.
There is no literature that connects the deregulation of domestic banking with the entry of foreign banks. Some articles do discuss the effect of banking deregulation on survival in the industry. Engwall and Johanson (1990) argue that deregulation will cause a transformation in existing networks of relationships between banks and their clients but not the importance of relationships. In their long-run analysis of banking in Sweden, Bergström et al., (1994) find that survival rates are negatively related to the freedom of bank operations and to the degree to which customer relationships already exist. That is, a more competitive environment hurts survival rates and banks that already have relationships with clients are more likely to survive.
Three hypotheses
The literature we have reviewed provides the basis for three hypotheses about the influences of learning, access to home-country related business, and the effect of impediments to the competitiveness of host-country banks.
First, we can expect the foreign banks to be subject both to selection and evolutionary learning (Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman 1995) . Selection will cull many of the entrants.
However, those entrants that survive should over time improve their performance relative to incumbent firms. The banks that enter do so in the expectation that they will succeed; risk and uncertainty mean that not all will survive. Those that do are likely to be the ones that correctly estimated that they could win share away from the incumbents. One can further argue that the survivors should on average do well enough to offset the losses of the unsuccessful entrants who have forfeited the sunk costs of entry (Lippman and Rumelt 1982) . Williams' (1995) findings for Japanese banks in Australia suggests the possibility of a quadratic term. Given the questions about Williams' results and our lack of degrees of freedom, we have chosen to remain with a simple time trend.
H1: The longer foreign banks have been present, the larger their market share.
Second, we expect the foreign banks' market share of banking system assets in a country to correlate positively with imports to the country and negatively with exports (Heinkel and Levi 1992) . Imports create a need for foreign bank services in the country.
Exports give domestic banks an incentive to go abroad and thus provide domestic clients with a substitute source of some banking services to. Tschoegl (1988) has a small (n=8) cross-sectional regression that supports this argument.
H2: The market share of foreign banks should wax with a trade deficit and wane with a trade surplus.
Lastly, financial crises should correlate positively with an expanded role for the foreign banks. Less tied to the domestic economy, the foreign banks can expand their activities while the domestic banks react to the crisis by curtailing their lending.
Furthermore, crises may remove regulatory barriers to the acquisition of local banks by foreign banks. There is, however, a counter-hypothesis due to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) . They argue that to get market share, the entrant has to underprice.
Existing firms will match the price only for good clients. The entrant will, therefore, suffer from adverse selection and so in a crisis, may be worse hurt than the domestic firms. Which effect will dominate is therefore an empirical issue. For the US, the evidence in Deyoung and Nolle (1986) is that foreignowned banks may have placed growth ahead of profitability. Still, we will state our maintained hypothesis as:
The foreign banks' market share should wax when domestic banks are facing loan losses and wane when the domestic banks are less burdened.
Empirical tests
Methodology
To test the three hypotheses we performed several OLS regressions for each country separately. The variability in the results below is a clear signal that pooling would be inappropriate. Absent pooling, we had limited degrees of freedom and so were unable to search over alternative specifications or to experiment with lags.
The market share data we use below, which we base on assets on the books of entities in the country, probably understates the foreign banks' market share in each Nordic country. Some foreign banks may be serving clients in each of the Scandinavian countries but from offices in London or other financial centers. This was certainly the case for Norway in the past and is the case for Chase Manhattan vis-à-vis Denmark.
Furthermore, as Tschoegl (1988) For each regression, we transformed the foreign banks' share of domestic banking system assets to the logit of the share. We did so to "bend" the dependent variable to obviate fitted values that exceeded 1, or more probably for our data, that fell below 0. For each of our four markets we set λ, the long-run asymptote, at just above the maximum share that the foreign banks have achieved in the market.
Our first independent variable was TIME, a simple time-trend to capture learning effects. We expected a positive coefficient.
The second independent variable was TRADE BALANCE, the natural logarithm of the ratio of each country's total exports to the country's total imports. Using the natural log ensures that balanced trade has no implications for market share. However, we further expected a negative coefficient; that is, we expected the foreign banks' market share to grow with imports and to decline with exports. Thus a trade surplus would imply a smaller market share for foreign banks than would a trade deficit.
The third independent variable was LOSSES, the system-wide ratio of loan-loss write-offs to loans. We expected the coefficient to be positive; foreign banks may have gained market share as the need to deal with problem loans constrained the large domestic banks from competing aggressively for loans.
For a parallel regression for each country we further transformed the dependent and independent variables by standardizing them. This procedure enables us to talk about economic significance as we have transformed all the coefficients into so-called "beta coefficients" that have the same dimension. The absolute value of the size of the coefficient gives its relative importance in terms of its ability to explain the variation in the dependent variable. (The gain in comparability does cost us "naturalness" of the independent variables; for example, the standardized variable measures an increment in TIME as one standard deviation of the sample data rather than as a year.)
Results
Table 5 presents the results. For Denmark we set λ = 1.5%. All three independent variables had the correct sign and all were statistically significant at the 5% level. The beta coefficients from the regression on the standardized variables shows TIME as the most important variable and TRADE BALANCE having a larger effect than LOSSES.
For Finland we set λ = 10%. TIME had the correct sign, but the other two variables had perverse signs. All three variables had a large effect in the sense that a one standard deviation change in the independent variable gave about a one standard deviation change in the dependent variable.
However, all these results were sensitive to our treatment of Handelsbanken's 1995 acquisition of Skopbank. We tried two methods to take this acquisition into account. First, we included a dummy variable (ACQUISITION) which took on a value of 1 in 1995 and 1997 (1996 market share data was unavailable) and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable proved to be the only important variable and the only one to have any statistically significant effect, although all coefficients retained their signs. Second, in a regression not in Table 5 , we estimated the model while omitting 1995 and 1997, and with λ = 3%; this too failed to improve the results. The coefficients on TIME and TRADE had perverse signs and LOSSES had the correct sign. Still, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the foreign banks' market share in Finland was uncorrelated with our explanatory variables.
For Norway we set λ = 4%. TIME was the only important factor.
For Sweden too we set λ = 4%. As the Table shows, TIME had a negative effect but was not an important factor. More interestingly, the foreign banks' market share waned when LOSSES were high and waxed when they were low. Also, the foreign banks' market share moved with the TRADE BALANCE rather than against it. Lastly, each of these two variables had a fairly large effect.
Conclusion
In all four Nordic countries, the survival rate among the initial foreign entrants appears low. From peak to trough, the number of foreign banks fell by a third to a half, depending on the country. Since then though in Finland and Sweden the number has now rebounded to a new peak. Denmark and Norway have seen more modest rebounds. Furthermore, in all four countries, the market share of the foreign banks increased over time. Also, the rank of the largest foreign bank has increased. One cannot make too much of this; a simple Gibrat (stochastic growth) process with an absorbing barrier on the left would tend to give this result (Sutton 1997) . Furthermore, the growth is due in large part to acquisition.
These observations are consistent with at least one of Geroski's (1995) In our data, the results for Denmark conformed with our expectations. The results for Finland and Norway were indeterminate. The results for Sweden were perverse.
The difference is congruent with differences in the elapsed time since opening; to recapitulate, the order of opening to foreign banks was Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. The results are not strong enough for us to more than conjecture that the reason may be changes in the identities and motives of the entrants over time.
As far as the link to trade is concerned, the results were mixed. The foreigners'
share moved against the balance (as expected) in Denmark and Norway, and with the balance (contrary to expectations) in Finland and Sweden.
Lastly, except in Denmark, the foreign banks' share of domestic banking system assets waxed and waned as the domestic banks waxed and waned. There is anecdotal evidence (Korea Herald 24 Feb 1999) that the foreign banks came to dominate wholesale banking in Finland during the crisis, but that will not show up in our data. In Finland,
Norway and Sweden, the foreign banks lost aggregate market share even as the domestic banks suffered loan losses. This is consistent with the Stiglitz-Weiss argument that the new entrants may have to take on less creditworthy customers on their books as they seek to establish themselves. They were then caught out when the crisis came.
Today we are seeing an increase in cross-border mergers and acquisition in banking.
Our results and the questions they raise constitute a call for further research on this increasingly important phenomenon. Table 5 Our results were strongly in accordance with expectations in the cases of Denmark, mixed or indeterminate for Finland (once we adjust for the acquisition of Skopbank) and Norway, and strongly opposite in the case of Sweden.
( 
